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This paper looks at the economic crisis in the UK. It argues that everyday 
accounting practices are deeply implicated in the inequitable distribution of income 
and wealth, a major cause of the economic crisis engulfing the neoliberal 
economies. Without adequate purchasing power middle and low income households 
cannot make the purchases necessary for a sustained revival of the economic 
activity. Accounting calculations and discourses play a major role in the 
determination of wages and taxes. They prioritise the interests of capital over labour 
and the state and have systematically eroded labour’s share of the gross domestic 
product. At the same time, despite a massive growth in corporate profitability, the 
UK state’s share of the national wealth in the form of tax revenues has also 
declined. It is argued that accounting practices which label payment of wages to 
labour and payment of taxes to the state as ‘costs’ amplify capitalist concerns about 
private appropriation of surpluses and have played a major role in assigning such 
payments to negative spaces. Through the sale of tax avoidance schemes to 
corporations and wealthy elites, accountancy firms have facilitated a skewed 
distribution of income of wealth and further constrained the state’s capacity to reflate 
the economy. Consequently, the tax burdens on the less well-off have increased 
and further eroded their purchasing power and possibilities of building a sustainable 
economy. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Since 2008, a banking crisis has dominated headlines in the western world and is 
threatening to destabilize the global financial system1. Experienced commentators 
(for example, Peston, 2008; Hellwig, 2009; Griffith-Jones, Ocampo and Stiglitz, 
2010) have identified financial innovations in the form of subprime mortgages, credit 
boom and complex financial instruments as key triggers for the crisis. They enabled 
banks to make profits, but the loans and speculative activities could not be 
sustained and the resulting defaults triggered a crisis that has spread to all sectors 
of the economy. Within the constraints of local political ideologies, countries have 
sought to manage and displace the crisis. The UK, the sixth largest economy in the 
world, with GDP of around £1.5 trillion (about US$2.3 trillion) has gone through a 
double-dip recession and in early 2013 is considered to be close to a triple-dip 
recession. It has provided £955 billion in loans and guarantees to ailing banks (UK 
House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, 2011; National Audit Office, 2010). 
In August 2012 the national debt2 of the UK, the third largest economy in the 
European Union, excluding financial interventions to rescue banks was estimated to 
be £1,039.5 billion (66.1 per cent of GDP) and £2,140.7 billion (136.0 per cent of 
GDP), if various financial commitments are taken into account UK Office for National 
Statistics, 2012a).  
 
The above statistics form the backdrop to arguably “the longest – and among the 
most costly – of its depressions in over a century3” facing the UK. In neoliberal 
                                                 
1Ireland, Iceland, Spain, Cyprus and Greece have secured loans from the 
International Monetary Fund and the European Union to manage the crisis.  
2There are disputes about how the level of debt should be measured. For example, 
some argue that it should include guarantees provided by the state, deficits on 
pension schemes of state employees, debts of local councils and public sector 
investment financed through the private sector. A report by McKinsey & Co states 
that in mid-2011 the UK’s total debt (combined personal, national and business 
debt) was 507% of GDP, the highest in the world after Japan (The Guardian, 19 
January 2012; http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/jan/19/uk-highest-debt-to-
gdp-ratio; accessed 19 January 2012).  
3 Financial Times, Britain must escape its longer depression, 1 September 2011 
(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c6c14d92-d332-11e0-9ba8-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1nKyr1lxm; accessed 13 December 2011). 
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traditions, the state has implemented austerity measures4, which will exacerbate 
income and wealth inequalities and erode the purchasing power of low/middle 
income households. The income and wealth inequalities were a key reason of the 
1929 stock market crash and the ensuing economic depression (Galbraith, 1961). 
Influential voices are again saying that the current “broken society and the broken 
economy [has] resulted from the growth of inequality” (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010: 
5), and that “Not only did rising inequality help get us into this mess, it is now a key 
factor preventing recovery” (Lansley, 2012: 758). 
 
Income inequalities in the UK have been increasing at more than the average for 
major industrialised nations ( Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2011) and are regressing towards the disparities of the 19th century 
era (High Pay Commission, 2011a). The wealth of the top 10% of households is 100 
times greater than the wealth of the poorest 10% (National Equality Panel, 2010). 
The middle-classes and the low-paid have borrowed extensively to maintain their 
quality of life and by October 2012 personal debt in the form of mortgages, loans, 
bank overdrafts and credit card bills reached around £1.421 trillion, the highest per 
capita in Europe5. The inability of the indebted to service the debt and continue 
consumption has been a major reason for the deepening economic crisis (Bailey, 
Coward and Whittaker, 2011). In principle, the state can alleviate some of the 
pressures on low and middle-income households by redistributing wealth, but 
neoliberal ideologies impose constraints on the possibility of raising additional tax 
revenues, especially as globalization and easy mobility of money have enabled 
major corporations and wealthy elites to discipline the state through tax avoidance 
(Shaxson, 2011). 
 
                                                 
4 These include a 19% reduction cuts in the budgets of government departments, 
redundancies for public sector workers with knock-on effects on the private sector, 
wage freezes, rise in indirect taxation from17.5% to 20%, increase in retirement age, 
cuts in social welfare payments and a higher 50% marginal rate of income tax on 
incomes above £150,000 (reduced to 45% from 2013-2014) (for an indication, see 
BBC News, George Osborne outlines detail of £6.2bn spending cuts; 24 May 2010; 
The Guardian, Budget will cost 1.3m jobs – Treasury, 29 June 2010; BBC News, 
Spending Review 2010: Key points at-a-glance, 21 October 2010). 
5 As per Credit Action 
(http://www.creditaction.org.uk/assets/PDF/statistics/2012/december-2012-
summary.pdf; accessed 28 December 2012). 
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Rising income and wealth inequalities are considered to be a key reason for the 
current economic crisis (for example, Iacoviello, 2008; Rajan, 2010; Kumhof and 
Rancière, 2010; Stiglitz, 2012). However, the role of accounting and accountants in 
sustaining and legitimizing inequalities has received little attention even though 
accounting6 technologies are central to calculation of wages and taxes (Whittington, 
1983). There is little scrutiny of the very concepts and categories of accounting 
which supposedly help businesses to control costs, promote competition, profits and 
efficiency, but also facilitate inequitable distribution of income and wealth. The 
labelling of wages paid to labour and taxes to the state as ‘cost’ or burdens is 
symptomatic of the above tendencies. The negative connotations legitimise 
discourses that encourage reduction of such payments even though one 
organisation’s cost is someone else’s income and their reduction erodes the 
purchasing power available to the people. The sale of tax avoidance schemes by 
accountancy firms and the erosion of tax revenues negatively affect the state’s 
ability to redistribute and is a key feature of the loss of purchasing power by low and 
middle income households (Mitchell and Sikka, 2011). 
 
This paper argues that the negative portrayal of wage and tax payments supports 
discourses that erode the workers’ share of national income and wealth and thus 
fuels the economic crisis. The worldviews embedded within accounting practices 
prioritise the interests of capital and have little regard for the interests of labour or 
the state. Most of the arguments and evidence in this paper primarily relates to the 
UK. The UK is a good case for studying because it is an exemplar of neoliberalism, 
characterised by a strong state which advocates deregulation, privatisation, free-
markets, uncontrolled financial rewards at the top, trickle-down economics, business 
friendly laws, curbs on trade union power, and has frequently been held up as a 
model for others to emulate (Gamble, 2009). 
 
                                                 
6 The economic crisis has encouraged some scrutiny of accounting practices, but it 
is primarily confined to the role of ‘fair value’ accounting in constructing and 
privileging a particular state of bank/corporate affairs (Ryan, 2008; Huizinga and 
Laeven, 2009; Laux and Leuz, 2009; UK House of Commons Treasury Committee, 
2009; Shaffer, 2010). This is laudable but is in danger of suggesting that ‘fair value’ 
is an exception and that the rest of accounting is somehow exempt from any role in 
the crisis.  
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To advance its arguments this paper is organised into four further sections. In 
political economy traditions the first section provides a framework for understanding 
the crisis and social conflict around division of economic surpluses. It argues that 
accounting discourses have naturalised the interests of capital and thus leave little 
scope for consideration of the welfare of workers. The second section provides UK 
evidence showing a significant decline in the workers’ share of income and wealth. 
This has also been accompanied by a decline in the state’s share of national income 
in the form of tax revenues. The third section builds on the insights of previous 
studies (for example, Hines, 1988; Chua, 1986; Tinker, 1991; Funnell, 1998) to 
argue that everyday accounting practices and accountancy firms are part of the 
social conflict and have facilitated an inequitable distribution of income. It argues 
that accounting technologies legitimise discourses which regard the payment of 
wages and taxes as burdens and thus encourage erosion of workers’ income 
taxation revenues accruing to the state. This section also builds on previous studies 
to argue that entrepreneurial accountancy firms have prioritised the interests of 
capital and wealthy clients by crafting tax avoidance schemes and cost minimisation 
programmes (for example, Christian-Aid, 2005, 2008; Sikka and Hampton, 2005; 
Sikka, 2008; Sikka and Willmott, 2010). These schemes and discourses enable 
accountancy firms to make profits, but erode much needed tax revenues and 
disable the state’s capacity to stimulate the economy through redistribution of 
wealth. Thus, everyday accounting practices and accountancy firms are shown to be 
key sites for perpetuation of inequalities and economic crisis. The final section 
summarises the paper and offers some strategies for mobilising politics and 





2. A Perspective on the Economic Crisis  
 
Capitalist economies are inherently crisis prone and the recurring crisis is often 
given visibility by the falling rate of profit, conflict between labour and capital, 
over/under investment, excessive credit, bubbles and economic crashes (O’Connor, 
1987). The crisis is managed, or displaced, by a variety of crisis management 
practices instituted by the state and a plethora of ideological state apparatuses 
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(Althusser, 1971) to enable capital to resume growth. The strategies are embedded 
in country-specific institutional structures and social relations of power (Esping-
Andersen, 1999). The neoliberal state is concerned with the long-term welfare of 
capital because it needs tax revenues for its survival and these are primarily levied 
upon profits and wages which in turn are dependent upon the private investment of 
capital (Habermas, 1976; Offe, 1984). Thus the interests of capital are embedded 
within the system and the state’s own survival is dependent on the long-term welfare 
of capital. At the same time the state has to secure social legitimacy for its 
reproduction and needs to be seen to be even-handed and responding to popular 
demands for jobs, improved material conditions and social welfare. The extent of the 
inclination to be even-handed depends on popular discourses and how various 
protagonists marshal political and ideological resources to advance their interests. 
As part of crisis management, the state may make concessions (e.g. welfare rights), 
but depending upon the ideological contingencies they can be diluted or withdrawn. 
Thus the state is enmeshed in an endless variety of contradictory policies, but the 
inherent antagonisms cannot be resolved.  
 
Despite inherent antagonisms, all production of wealth requires co-operation 
between varieties of stakeholders and each expects a return. For example, investors 
and creditors provide finance in expectation of a return in the form of dividends and 
other payments; employees provide human sweat, blood, brawn and brains in 
expectation of a return in the form of wages and salaries and society provides public 
goods and social infrastructure and expects a return in the form of taxes. However, 
the exact share of surpluses accruing to each party cannot be fixed and is subject to 
endemic struggles and ruptures. 
 
Capital needs to exploit all factors of production, including labour, to expand itself. In 
a globalized economy capital is mobile and may increase its share through 
relocation, a reserve army of labour, mobilising the state to enact controls to limit the 
power of labour and by promoting discourses which associate payment of taxes and 
higher wages as a threat to economic wellbeing of a country. It also provides higher 
financial rewards to accountants and managers ‘watching over capital’ and 
advancing and protecting the interests of capital (Carchedi, 1977). Unlike capital, 
labour cannot be stored and its mobility is severely constrained by geography, 
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technological innovations and competitive advantages pursued by nation states. 
Therefore, labour needs to develop strategies for maintaining or enhancing its share 
of economic surpluses. Broadly speaking, in neoliberal societies labour can marshal 
two forms of power to resist erosion of its share of surpluses: “market power” and 
“political power” (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005). Market power enables trade unions 
to protect the workers’ share of income and wealth through strategies of conflict and 
co-operation. Depending on the political contexts, trade unions could be co-opted 
into company boards, remuneration committees and systems of corporate 
governance and influence the division of wealth and/or they could be excluded from 
such processes and left to pursue demands for improved wages through industrial 
action and strikes. An uneasy compromise may prevail, but equilibrium is not 
possible as gains for labour may be seen as losses for capital generally and may 
encourage it to migrate and/or mobilise the state to introduce counter policies. 
Market power itself is dependent upon political power which is shaped by electoral 
outcomes and the extent to which labour can colonise the ideological agenda to 
advance its interests. Trade unions may enrol and fund political parties to advance 
their interests, but the outcomes are uncertain because in common with the general 
public their members also have common and competing interests derived from 
class, age, gender, ethnicity, religion, family and other interests. Thus, the 
advancement of workers’ interests is always dependent upon forming coalitions with 
other sections of society.  
 
In general, left-leaning governments may be more responsive to workers’ demands 
and help to expand, or maintain, their share of income and wealth. Conversely, a tilt 
to the right creates possibilities for the erosion of market and political power 
exercised by workers. A tilt to the right may be more sympathetic to capital and 
enhance returns to capital or check the power of labour, but it also sows seeds of its 
negation as without adequate purchasing power workers and their families cannot 
purchase goods and services produced by capitalist enterprises and thus 
businesses cannot realise economic surpluses. If workers are able to secure higher 
wages then the return to capital may be eroded, which in turn may have a negative 
effect on the levels of economic activity, investment, production, jobs and ultimately 
the legitimacy of the state.  
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The struggles over a greater share of economic surpluses take place in 
contemporary institutional structures characterised by rationalisation, efficiency, 
calculation, control and predictability (Weber, 1948; 1968, 1992). Neoliberal 
institutions disseminate discourses which attach positive signs to private profits, cost 
reduction, competition and efficiency, but negative signs to wages paid to workers 
and taxes paid to the state. These inscriptions are circulated through education, 
media, policymakers and opinion formers to form commonsensical understandings 
of contemporary life. Accounting calculations and logics are central to the 
development of capitalism (Chiapello, 2007) and Johnson (1972) notes that the 
“functions of the accountant in providing the means of cost or management control 
were regarded as so crucial for the development of capitalist enterprises that Weber 
defined the capitalist business form as an establishment which determines its 
income-yielding power by calculation according to the methods of modern book-
keeping and the striking of a balance” (p. 66). Accounting calculations frequently 
provide a legitimising rhetoric for notions of cost saving and efficiency, and in the 
process advance sectional interests and disarm critics (Hopwood, 1984). 
 
The concepts of profit, costs and efficiency are highly abstract, but central to any 
measure of the welfare of capital. Contemporary accounting practices are designed 
to ‘watch over capital’ and ensure that economic surpluses accrue to the absent 
owners of capital (Johnson, 1972). This is pursued not only by designing internal 
controls and audits to prevent leakages of capital, but also by giving visibility to 
organisational processes, decisions, allocations and distributions (Armstrong, 1987). 
The calculations may be highly abstract, but nevertheless shape subjectivity and 
mobilise people. Indeed, accounting calculations measure and label things to give 
visibility to what can be talked about or remain obscured (Hines, 1988). Accounting 
creates specific spaces and categories to enable focus on efficiency, profitability and 
enterprise.  
 
At the same time the cold logic of accounting creates invisibilities by detaching 
numbers from the lived experiences of the people and prevents consideration of 
alternatives (Funnell, 1998). For example, a focus on labour costs makes people 
anonymous and reduces the lives of employees to quantifiable objects who can be 
hired, fired and manipulated in the pursuit of private profits. Little consideration is 
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given to the human consequences of downsizing and reducing someone’s income 
even though that reduction would not enable people to buy the products and 
services sold by capitalist enterprises, a necessary condition for making profits. 
Thus, accounting naturalises an instrumental logic that excludes and silences other 
criteria for assessing value. The inscriptions and spaces created by accounting 
calculations are infused with historical struggles that shape the division of economic 
surpluses by “bolstering unequal economic relations” (Chua, 1986: 623). In this 
context, accounting is not just a technique, but a resource in the political struggles 
over allocation and appropriation of economic surpluses. As accounting is closely 
aligned with the interests of capital, anything that obstructs expansion of capital’s 
share of surpluses is called a ‘cost’ or a burden and is consigned to negative 
spaces. Within the hegemonic discourse of capitalism, a widespread view is that 
costs must be reduced and even eliminated. In this worldview, the payment of taxes 
and wages are not seen as legitimate rewards for the employment of social and 
human resources, but as barriers to expansion of capital. Consequently, much of the 
accounting technology is pre-occupied with controlling costs, measuring and 
reporting performance to enable corporate managers to plan and control their 
operations in the service of capital.  
 
A wide variety of advisers, consultants and opinion formers are enrolled to 
disseminate discourses that portray payments to workers and the state as a threat 
to the welfare of capital. In this context, major accountancy firms are also a major 
fraction of capital and their profits are conditional upon creating demands for their 
services. The entrepreneurial accountancy firms have used their expertise to craft 
cost minimisation programmes and tax avoidance schemes to enable their clients to 
avoid taxes and erode the state’s capacity to increase workers’ share of national 
wealth through redistributive programmes. Accountancy firms have extensive 
organisational structures and incentivise staff to develop tax avoidance schemes 
(US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2003, 2005). Within 
accountancy firms, tax departments often function as profit centres and are 
assigned revenue generating targets. Those able to reduce tax bills for clients are 
rewarded with promotions and salary increases, further naturalising the view that 
undermining taxes is positive and rewarding. In a parliamentary debate, a UK 
legislator said that “There are armies of bankers, lawyers and accountants who 
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ensure that even though the letter of the law is respected, increasingly immoral 
ways are found of perverting the spirit of the law to ensure that tax is avoided. … To 
hide its true purpose, the tax avoidance industry adopts the language of real 
business, so technical innovation and reinventing your business model do not mean 
finding new products, services and markets, and new ways of supplying them. No, 
they mean registering your business in a tax haven and becoming a non-dom to 
avoid tax while still enjoying the, admittedly decreasing, benefits and services which 
make this country the civilised place that it is7”. In the words of the US Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2005): “dubious tax shelter sales were 
no longer the province of shady, fly-by-night companies with limited resources. They 
had become big business, assigned to talented professionals at the top of their 
fields and able to draw upon the vast resources and reputations of the country’s 
largest accounting firms …” (p.9).  
 
The carefully cultivated understandings of capitalism are routinely reaffirmed by 
economic theories which claim that the objective of the firm is to maximise 
shareholder wealth and that this can be achieved by reducing wages and taxes. 
This social construction is legitimised by naturalising concepts and measurement of 
accounting income solely from the shareholder perspective. This is done even 
though shareholders hold shares in companies for a comparatively short period and 
function more like speculators and traders rather than owners with responsibilities. 
In many corporations they provide only a small fraction of the long-term risk-capital 
(Sikka, 2012). The idealised model privileged in accounting leaves little room for 
consideration of the welfare of other social constituencies8. The same discourses 
are enshrined in the literature on corporate finance and its focus on investors, 
managers and agency costs neglects the role of employees and the state in wealth 
                                                 
7 Hansard, House of Lords Debates, 17 March 2011, col. 375. 
8 The shareholder wealth maximisation model may be peculiar to neoliberalism and 
is not prioritised in other social formations. For example, in former Yugoslavia, 
considered to be a socialist country, the company was considered to be owned by 
its workers.  Hence, the income was the share attributable to workers, while the 
return paid to providers of finance capital was expensed (Kardelj, 1981a, 1981b). In 
state capitalism, as practised in the former Soviet Union, the state was the owner of 
the means of production and thus the income was the share paid to the state 
(Campbell, 1963; Ash and Strittmatter, 1992). I am grateful to the editors for drawing 
my attention to this. 
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creation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Accounting regulators naturalise the power of 
capital by claiming that the main purpose of financial reporting is “to provide financial 
information about the reporting entity that is useful to present and potential equity 
investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions in their capacity as capital 
providers” (International Accounting Standards Board, 2008, p.12). The interests of 
capital and capital maintenance concepts are central to all accounting calculations 
and construction of income (Whittington, 1983). Thus the bottom line in the profit 
and loss account reports the extent to which shareholders, as idealized owners and 
representatives of capital, are richer. It is effectively a celebration of the victory of 
capital over all-comers, including labour and the state. The influence of such logics 
establishes boundaries and squeezes the space for competing discourses and does 
not encourage consideration of the impact of the loss of wages and tax revenues on 
people, communities and even on capital itself because without adequate 
purchasing power people cannot buy the goods and services and thus capital 
cannot accumulate profits. 
 
Workers face an uphill struggle in securing an equitable share of income and wealth 
because it is not easy to oppose the discourse of cost reduction, efficiency, 
competitiveness and profits, which are mobilised to reduce wages paid to labour and 
taxes paid to the state. After all, who would publicly claim to advocate inefficiency, 
higher costs and uncompetitive firms? Some strategies of resistance may be 
developed, but that would depend on country-specific institutional structures and the 
extent to which workers and trade unions could deploy their market and political 
power to undermine the negative signs assigned to the payment of wages and 
mobilise the state to redistribute wealth.  
 
3. Inequalities in the UK  
 
This section looks at two elements that have eroded the workers ability to spend and 
stimulate the economic activity. Firstly, since the 1970s Labour’s share of the 
national wealth in the form of wages and salaries9, expressed as a percentage of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), has significantly declined. Wages and salaries have 
                                                 
9 This includes employer social contributions, maternity pay, paternity pay, sick pay 
and benefits in kind 
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been casualties of the debates about corporate profitability and efficiency. The 
policies of the state relating to taxation, labour union laws and privatisations have 
eroded workers’ market and political power. Secondly, the tax revenues accruing to 
the state, expressed as a percentage of GDP, have also declined, mainly due to 
political choices to reduce taxes on corporate profits and incomes of the rich. This 
has constrained the state’s ability to redistribute wealth and boost the purchasing 
power of ordinary people. 
 
3.1. Income and wealth distribution 
 
After the Second World War, the UK economy was rebuilt and unemployment 
virtually disappeared (Hobsbawm, 1969). By the late 1960s, in the face of emerging 
competition from Germany and Japan, the rate of profitability of the UK corporate 
sector began to decline. For example, in 1960 the average rate of return before 
interest and tax at current replacement cost stood at 13.7%, but by 1970 it declined 
to 8.9% (British Business, September 1988, p. 32; also see Armstrong, Glynn and 
Harrison, 1984). The 1973 Arab-Israeli war provided a further kick as the price of oil, 
a vital commodity for the British economy, rose virtually overnight from US$2 to 
US$11 a barrel and increased UK industrial costs (Green and Sutcliffe, 1987). At the 
same time uncontrolled speculative activity brought about the crash of a number of 
secondary banks and the crisis rapidly spread to the insurance and property sectors 
(Reid, 1982; Clarke, 1986). By 1975, the UK general index of prices (or inflation) 
reached 24.9% compared to 2.5% in 1967 (UK Central Statistical Office, 1988), and 
the average rate of corporate profitability, before interest and tax, declined to 3.9% 
(British Business, September 1988, p. 32). Some argued that “a continuing drop in 
the return on investment, whatever its cause, would raise serious doubts about the 
stability of what is loosely described as the capitalist system” (Financial Times, 4 
July 1973, p 22). The government bailed-out the financial sector, and in 1976 it itself 
had to secure loans from the International Monetary Fund (Reid, 1982; Clarke, 
1986).   
 
The above period is marked by low unemployment rates (Nickell, Nunziata and 
Ochel, 2005) and strong trade unions. Since the early 1970s, the UK government 
had been struggling to control inflation and imposed statutory controls on prices and 
 14
wages. In 1973-74, this policy was challenged by coal-miners who took prolonged 
industrial action leading to the declaration of a state of emergency. Eventually, the 
Conservative government called a general election on the theme of “who governs” 
and lost. Significantly, the 1974 election manifesto of the incoming Labour 
administration, with strong links with trade unions, called for “a fundamental and 
irreversible shift in the balance of power and wealth in favour of working people and 
their families … Eliminate poverty wherever it exists in Britain …Achieve far greater 
economic equality - in income, wealth and living standards …10”. In the above 
environment, labour’s share of national income, expressed as a percentage of the 
GDP, remained steady and even grew. In the 1960s it averaged around 58-60% of 
GDP and peaked at around 65.1% in 1976 (Sikka, 2008). By 1979, trade union 
membership peaked at around 13.2 million, or 55.4% of the workforce11. However, 
subsequent developments weakened trade unions and with it the workers’ ability to 
maintain their share of national wealth. 
 
The election of the Conservative Party in 1979 and its espousal of new right 
philosophies marked a significant tilt to the right and a major shift away from 
consensual politics and managed capitalism. The administration led by Margaret 
Thatcher emphasised deregulation, free markets, curbs on trades union rights, 
dismantling of trade barriers and exchange controls to control inflation and 
encourage mobility of capital. It privatised state-owned enterprises, most notably 
steel, gas, electricity, water, coal, docks, automobiles and other industries, often 
with large trade union membership. The government ‘rolled back the state’ by 
making heavy cuts to the public sector, an area where trade union membership was 
particularly high. Sir Alan Budd, a key economic adviser to the Thatcher 
administration, noted that some key policymakers “… never believed for a moment 
that this was the correct way to bring down inflation They did, however, see that it 
would be a very, very good way to raise unemployment, and raising unemployment 
was an extremely desirable way of reducing the strength of the working classes -- if 
you like, that what was engineered there in Marxist terms was a crisis of capitalism 
                                                 
10http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1974/Feb/1974-feb-labour-
manifesto.shtml; accessed 31October 2011. 
11http://www.unionhistory.info/timeline/1960_2000.php; accessed 7 November 2011. 
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which re-created a reserve army of labour and has allowed the capitalists to make 
high profits ever since12”.  
 
The Thatcher administration identified trade unions as “the enemy within” (Dorey, 
1995: 133) and perpetuated the view that the wellbeing of the country was under 
threat. Through the Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982 and the Trade Union Act 
1984 the government abolished the ‘closed shop’, required compulsory balloting (not 
just formal showing of hands) of trade union members before any industrial action, 
banned secondary picketing and introduced legislation which could be used by 
employers to seek compensation from trade unions13 for strike action (Milne, 2004). 
In 1984-85, the attempts to close or privatise coal-mines once again led to 
confrontation with the miners’ trade union, a battle which was decisively lost by the 
union and changed the political landscape of the country (Reid, 2005). 
 
A combination of government faith in the growth of service sector and the forces of 
globalisation led to the comparative demise of mining, shipbuilding, auto, steel and 
engineering, often the heartlands of trade unionism. Many well-paid skilled and 
semi-skilled jobs disappeared. In 1981, the UK manufacturing sector provided 
employment for 5.8 million workers and, but by 1996 it declined to just over 4 million 
(Buchanan et al., 2009). Trade union and workers’ power to maintain their share of 
wealth was eroded by rising unemployment. In the recession of the early 1980s, UK 
unemployment reached 3.07 million, the highest since the 1930s depression, and 
remained above 3 million until 1986 and then declined to 1.2 million in 1999 (UK 
House of Commons Library,1999). Many in full employment also found their wages 
depressed. In the newly privatised parts of the economy many contractors often 
rehired the same staff on lower wages and inferior working conditions (UNISON, 
2004; Wills, 2008). In 1979, UK trade unions stood at nearly 13.2 million (or 55.4% 
of the workforce) members14, but by 1996 it shrank to less than 6 million (UK 
                                                 
12New Statesman, A “nightmare” experience? 8 March 2010 
(http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2010/03/thatcher-economic-
budd-dispatches; accessed 20 December 2011).  
13 There are no equivalent obligations on corporations. For example, they don’t have 
to ballot shareholders or employees to move production. 
14As per http://www.unionhistory.info/timeline/1960_2000.php; accessed 4 August 
2011. 
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Department of Trade and Industry, 2005). Against this background corporate 
profitability recovered from a low of 3.9% in 1975 to 12.8% and 12.9% between 
1996 and 199815. The brunt of this was borne by workers as their share of the 
national wealth in the forms of wages and salaries declined from 65.1% of GDP (in 
1976) to a post-war low of 52.6% in 1996 (Sikka, 2008).  
 
In 1997 the Labour Party, generally more sympathetic to trade unions, formed the 
government but it continued with many of the New Right policies. The Prime Minister 
soothed business anxieties by stating that the “British law is the most restrictive on 
trade unions in the western world” (cited in Compass, 2007, p. 22) and in the next 
13 years of its tenure in office the Labour Party did not reverse any of the trade 
union laws. It continued with privatisation of state-owned enterprises, did not 
restructure the economy and continued to express its hope that the service sector, 
especially financial services, would somehow be the renaissance of the UK 
economy. A raft of corporate governance codes emerged (for example, Committee 
on the Financial aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992; Committee on Corporate 
Governance, 1998), but equitable distribution of income and employee rights were 
not on the agenda. The manufacturing sector was still important to the UK economy, 
but employment in this sector declined from 4 million in 1996 (Buchanan et al., 
2009) to 2.5 million in 2011 (UK House of Commons, 2011). Employment in the 
services sector, generally low-paid, increased from 2.35 million in 1991 to 4.7 million 
in 2007. For the same period employment in the financial services sector remained 
relatively flat at around one million. The government expanded the public sector to 
tackle unemployment through huge investment in healthcare and education. By 
2009, trade union membership stood at 6.5 million (26.6% of the work force), well 
short of the 1979 peak (UK Department of Business Innovation and Skills, 2010). By 
September 2011, the UK unemployment levels reached 2.62 million16. The income 
of some workers had been lifted by the National Minimum Wage Act 1998, which 
established a national minimum wage though critics argued that the low rates 
pushed poor people into misery and debt (Abrams, 2002; Toynbee, 2003). Despite 
                                                 
15 As per the UK Office for National Statistics, 1 December 1999 edition (n.d.). 
16The Daily Telegraph, Eurozone crisis ‘not to blame’ for rise in UK jobless, 16 
November 2011 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/jobs/8894845/Eurozone-crisis-
not-to-blame-for-rise-in-UK-jobless.html; accessed 16 November 2011). 
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the introduction of the national minimum wage, in 2011 the workers’ share of GDP 
stood at 53.8% (UK Office for National Statistics, 2012b). For the second quarter of 
2012 the average rate of corporate profitability was 12.7% (UK Office for National 
Statistics, 2012e). 
 
The workers’ share of national wealth has declined from about 65.1% of GDP in 
1976 to 53.8% in 2011. However, the headline statistics conceal the way the 
shrinking share of income has been divided. Most notably, the poor have become 
poorer, middle and low-income earners have seen their share shrink and the highest 
paid earners, often senior corporate executives and professional labour have 
increased their share. In October 2012, the average gross wage for the UK, 
including bonuses, was around £24,500 a year (UK Office for National Statistics, 
2012c) though there are considerable regional variations. On 1 October 2012, the 
National Minimum Wage rose from £6.08 to £6.19 per hour (about £12,000 a year17) 
though many argue that just to survive employees need to earn a Living Wage of 
£8.30 per hour (about £17,200 per annum) in London and £7.20 per hour (around 
£15,000 per annum) elsewhere. However, evidence shows that 299,000 people 
were on rates below the full minimum wage (UK Office for National Statistics, 
2012d), 150,000 workers were being unlawfully denied the minimum wage18 and 
altogether around 5 million workers receive less than the Living Wage (Savage, 
2011). In early 2010 the number of people working part-time because they could not 
find full-time work stood at a record 1,046,000 (Institute for Public Policy Research, 
2010). There are also workers who for a variety of reasons choose part-time 
employment. Since 1984 the number of people in part-time work has risen steadily 
by over half (53 per cent) to reach 7.7 million. The part-time and temporary workers 
are generally on inferior rates of pay and working conditions.  
 
Whilst it is not possible to reconstitute the government statistics by separating the 
proportions of GDP going to executives and other workers, there are some studies 
                                                 
17 There are four separate hourly rates: £6.19 for workers age 21 or over, £4.98 for 
18-20 years old, £3.68 is the 16-17 year rate for workers above school leaving age 
but under-18, and £2.65 – the apprentice rate for apprentices under 19 or 19 and 
over and in the first year of apprenticeship. 
18BBC News, Staff 'not getting minimum wage’, 22 December 2007 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7157056.stm, accessed 15 October 2011). 
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which note that incomes of those at the bottom have been severely eroded. For 
example, Hills (1999) noted that during the period from 1979 to 1995, the incomes of 
the poorest 10-20 per cent were little or no higher in real terms, despite overall 
income growth of 40 per cent. Between 1977 and 2010 the share of GDP accruing 
to the bottom half of workers fell by more than a quarter.  For every £100 of GDP 
they received £16 in 1977, by 2010 their share fell to £12 and after taking-out 
bonuses their share declined to just £10. In contrast, the top 10% of earners 
increased their share from £12 per £100 of GDP to £14 and after taking account of 
bonuses it rose to £16 (Bailey, Coward and Whittaker, 2011). A study by the High 
Pay Commission (2011a) concluded that “In the past 10 years, the average annual 
bonus for FTSE 350 directors went up by 187 per cent and the average year-end 
share price declined by 71 per cent. … We have witnessed massive growth in 
performance related pay and yet no such corresponding leap forward in company 
performance” (p. 4 and 8). The Commission added that “In 1978, the reported 
earnings of the top paid director at British Aerospace was just £29,000. By 2010, the 
salary, benefits plus bonus of the highest paid director at BAE Systems, the 
company British Aerospace has evolved into, was £2,363,000. Over the period, that 
represents a pay increase, excluding share-based incentives, of 8,048 per cent, 
which compares to a corresponding rise since 1978 of 556 per cent in the median 
earnings of all UK full-time male employees” (High Pay Commission, 2011b: 10). 
Another study (Incomes Data Services, 2011) reported that despite a deepening 
recession, during 2010-11, the total remuneration of FTSE 100 directors jumped by 
an average of 43%. In sharp contrast, recent trends indicate a wage freezes or cuts 
in real wages for workers. For example, between 2010 and 2011 the earnings of the 
bottom 10% of workers grew by just 0.1 per cent, compared to a rate of inflation of 
nearly 5% (UK Office for National Statistics, 2011b). 
 
Since income constitutes a major part of accumulated wealth, a skewed distribution 
has consolidated inequalities in the distribution of wealth. In 1997, the collective 
wealth of the UK’s 1,000 richest people was estimated to be £98.99 billion, but by 
2012 despite the banking crash and recession their wealth increased to over £414 
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billion19. The most recent official government statistics (UK Office for National 
Statistics, 2009) reported that in 2006/08, the median household wealth was 
£204,500, including private pension wealth and value of dwellings. The least wealthy 
half of UK households held 9% of the total wealth, while the wealthiest half had 91% 
of the total. The wealthiest 1% of households had 23% of the country's cash, 
property and saleable assets and the wealthiest 20% of households had 62% of 
total wealth. The least wealthy 10% of households had negative values for both net 
financial wealth and net property wealth. A government commissioned study 
reported that the UK income and wealth inequalities were bigger than those in other 
industrialised countries and at their highest level for over half a century (National 
Equality Panel, 2010). The study estimated that the household wealth of the top 
10% of the population, at an average of £853,000, was nearly 100 times higher than 
the wealth of the poorest 10%, who had property, savings and personal possessions 
worth less than £8,000. The bottom 1% had negative wealth (liabilities exceeding 
assets) of more than £3,840. However, the concentration of wealth at the top is 
highly marked. Individuals in the top 1% of the population had total household 
wealth of £2.6m or more.  
 
In 2009-10, after taking account of housing costs, some 13.5 million people, 
including 1.8 million pensioners20 and 2.5 million children were estimated to be living 
below the poverty line21 (Jin et al., 2011). With the austerity programmes, cuts in 
social welfare and the rising cost of living the numbers are expected to rise sharply 
(Brewer, Muriel and Wren-Lewis, 2009; Brewer et al., 2011). The government 
statistics for 2008 show that the savings ratio22 in the UK has plummeted to 1.7% of 
total resources, the lowest recorded since 1970. Only 38% of working-age people - 
                                                 
19 The Sunday Times, Sunday Times Rich List 2012 – UK’s Richest People, 15 May 
2012 (http://www.therichest.org/nation/sunday-times-rich-list/; accessed 29 
September 2012) 
20 The Daily Telegraph, 1.8 million pensioners living below the poverty line, 13 April 
2011 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/pensions/8448018/1.8-
million-pensioners-live-below-the-poverty-line.html; accessed 10 November 2011). 
21This is defined as households with incomes below 60% of the median. 
22 BBC News, UK household savings lowest in 40 years says ONS, 8 April 2010 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8608935.stm; accessed 10 September 2011).  
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11.6 million out of 30.4 million people - are able to save for a private pension23. The 
skewed distribution of income and wealth has consigned many people to live on 
credit. In October 2012 the personal debt (mortgages, overdrafts, loans and credit 
cards) of individuals hit £1.421 trillion and despite the recession the government 
expects it to reach £2.12 trillion by 201524. The prospect of ordinary people being 
able to reinvigorate the economy through their spending power is bleak. 
 
3.2. Shifting tax burdens 
 
In principle what the mode of production denies to workers can be secured, 
depending on social and political forces, through redistributions by the state in the 
shape of welfare rights and provision of public goods. This presupposes that the 
state can be mobilised to promote such policies. Depending upon the ideological 
imperatives of the day, the state may adjust taxes to stimulate or constrain demand 
and create the social stability necessary for smooth accumulation of profits. 
 
The UK state’s share of national income, in the form of tax revenues, has declined 
significantly. In 1982-83, tax revenues were 38.2% of GDP, but despite a massive 
increase in corporate profitability, they are expected to be around 35.5% of GDP in 
2012-1325. This outcome has been achieved in two ways. Firstly, under pressure 
from elites, successive governments reduced corporate taxes and higher rates of 
income tax for wealthy individuals. Secondly, in the era of globalisation and easy 
mobility of money, the tax avoidance industry has aggressively enabled major 
corporations and wealthy elites to avoid taxes. The state has shifted taxes to labour, 
consumption and savings, which has further eroded the purchasing power of 
ordinary people. 
  
                                                 
23 Department of Work and Pensions press release, 30 December 2011 
(http://www.dwp.gov.uk/newsroom/press-releases/2011/dec-2011/dwp152-11.shtml; 
accessed 3 January 2012). 
24The Daily Telegraph, The debt trap time bomb, 31 October 2011 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/jeffrandall/8859082/The-debt-trap-
time-bomb.html, accessed 1 November 2011). 
25 Data as recorded on The Guardian website 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/apr/25/tax-receipts-1963#data; 
accessed 15 September 2012). 
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The UK corporation tax rate has declined from 52% of taxable profits in 1982 to 30% 
in 2007 and will be reduced to 21% in April 2014. In the name of economic 
enterprise top rates of income tax have been reduced. In 1978-79, the starting rate 
was 25%, basic rate 33% and higher marginal rates, depending on income, ranged 
from 40% to 83%. In addition, an investment income surcharge of 15% applied to 
very high earners and thus some individuals were taxed at a marginal rate of 98% 
(Adam and Browne, 2009). Since 1979, the top rates of income tax have declined 
significantly. For 2012-13, a basic rate of 20% applied to annual income up to 
£34,370 and thereafter a marginal rate of 40% applied for income up to £150,000. In 
2010-11, an additional marginal rate of 50% was introduced for incomes above 
£150,000. This is to be reduced to 45% from April 2013. All individuals receive tax 
free allowances which for 2012-13 is £8,105. However, the tax free income and 
bands for higher rates of income tax have not kept pace with inflation. As a result, in 
2011-12 alone some 750,000 middle-earners became subject to 40% tax rate for the 
first time and their number will swell by another 850,000 in 201426. Due to the loss of 
welfare payments, higher National Insurance Contributions (known as social security 
contributions in some countries) and fiscal drag, thousands of middle income 
individuals may effectively be taxed at a marginal rate of 73%27. 
 
The arguments that lower corporate and income tax rates would somehow reduce 
tax avoidance have not had the desired results. The UK government admits to a tax 
gap28 of £35 billion though others have claimed it to be more than £100 billion a year 
(Mitchell and Sikka, 2011). The UK’s tax authority Her Majesty’s Revenue and 
Customs (HMRC) is scrutinising some 41,000 tax avoidance schemes, which 
threaten some £10.2 billion of tax revenues (National Audit Office, 2012). Despite a 
65% improvement in overall corporate profitability the actual tax take from 
                                                 
26 The Daily Telegraph, IFS: 1.6m to pay higher rate of tax for first time, 31 January 
2011 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/consumertips/tax/8292286/IFS-
1.6m-to-pay-higher-rate-of-tax-for-first-time.html; accessed 14 October 2011).  
27 The Daily Telegraph, Why 50pc tax row misses the point: what about the 
squeezed middle? 29 September 2011 
(http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ianmcowie/100012271/why-50pc-tax-row-
misses-the-point-what-about-the-squeezed-middle; accessed 7 November 2011).  
28 Tax gap is the difference between taxes that actually are collected and the 
amounts which lawfully can be collected. Its components are tax arrears, amounts 
unlawfully evaded and the amounts avoided.  
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corporations has declined from £26 billion in 2000/01 to £21bn in 2011/1229. A UK 
government report (National Audit Office, 2007) stated that for the year 2005-2006, 
220 of the 700 largest companies paid no corporation tax and a further 210 
companies paid less than £10 million each and 12 of the UK's largest companies 
extinguished all liabilities in 2005-2006 and many more claimed tax losses. Barclays 
Bank is thought to have paid corporation tax of only £113 million on its 2009 profits if 
£11.6 billion30. In early 2012, the UK government introduced retrospective legislation 
to disable two schemes that would have enabled Barclays to avoid £500 million of 
corporate taxes31. In 2006, it was reported that 54 identified billionaires living in the 
UK paid “income tax of £14.7m on a combined fortune of £126bn … at least 32 of 
the individual and family groups had not paid any personal taxes on their wealth32” 
 
With the aid of accountants and financial advisers, companies and wealthy elites 
have made extensive use of tax havens, complex corporate structures, joint 
ventures, trusts, transfer pricing, royalty programmes, overhead allocations and a 
variety of income shifting techniques to avoid taxes (Sikka and Willmott, 2010; 
Palan, Murphy and Chavagneux, 2010; Action-Aid, 2011; Shaxson, 2011). The 100 
largest companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange are estimated to have 
34,216 subsidiaries, joint ventures and associated companies. Of these 8,492 (38%) 
are located in tax havens, many with sparse populations. With 1,649 subsidiaries 
the banking sector is the heaviest user of tax havens (Action-Aid, 2011). Many rich 
individuals have used offshore facilities and complex tax avoidance schemes to 
                                                 
29 The Daily Telegraph, Tax bill for giant companies falls despite surge in profits, 27 
December 2012 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/9767701/Tax-bill-for-giant-
companies-falls-despite-surge-in-profits.html; accessed 28 December 2012) 
30 The Guardian, Barclays bank forced to admit it paid just £113m in corporation tax 
in 2009, 18 February 2011 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/feb/18/barclays-bank-113m-corporation-
tax; accessed 30 November 2011). 
31 The Daily Telegraph, The Daily Telegraph, HMRC stops Barclays using 'abusive' 
schemes to avoid paying tax, 27 February 2012 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/consumertips/tax/9109717/HM
RC-stops-Barclays-using-abusive-schemes-to-avoid-paying-tax.html; accessed 28 
February 2012). 
32 Cited in Accountancy Age, UK is the first onshore tax haven for billionaires, 4 
December 2006 (http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/1769449/uk-onshore-
tax-haven-billlionaires; accessed on 30 October 2011). 
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reduce their taxes (Mitchell and Sikka, 2011). Despite some reforms33 the leakages 
of tax revenues has continued. Successive governments have shifted taxes away 
from corporations and wealthy elites to consumption, savings and labour. For 
example, tax free personal allowances and tax bands for higher rates of tax have 
not kept pace with inflation, Value Added Tax (VAT), excise duties and National 
Insurance Contributions have been raised. As indirect taxes tend to be regressive 
the incidence of taxation on the less well-off has increased. In his 2011 budget 
speech UK Chancellor George Osborne told parliament that “Some of the richest 
people in this country have been able to pay less tax than the people who clean for 
them34”. Official government statistics (UK Office for National Statistics, 2011a) 
show that for 2009-10, households in the bottom 20% of income bracket paid 35.5% 
of their gross income in direct and indirect taxes, compared to 33.7% for the top 
20% of households. Individuals in the top income brackets paid a higher proportion 
of their income in direct taxes, but the differences are very stark for indirect taxes. 
The poorest 20% of households paid 25.3% of their income in indirect taxes 
compared to just 9.3% for the top 20%. 
 
This section has drawn attention to two developments. Firstly, the workers’ share of 
national wealth has declined. The gains have primarily been made by corporations 
whose rates of profitability have significantly increased.  Secondly, the state’s share 
of tax revenues has declined and constrained its ability to redistribute wealth and 
stimulate the economy. Successive governments have shifted tax obligations away 
from mobile capital and wealthy elites to labour, consumption and savings. As a 
result, people at the bottom of income and wealth distribution pay a greater 
proportion of their income in taxes compared to the rich. These changes have 
eroded the purchasing power of ordinary people and constrained their capacity to 
stimulate economic activity.  
 
4. The hand of accounting and accountancy firms  
                                                 
33 The UK Finance Act 2004 introduced the “Disclosure of Tax Avoidance Schemes” 
(DOTAS) rules and required promoters of avoidance schemes to disclose the main 
elements of the schemes to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HRMC) within a 
specified time period. The UK disclosure requirements are themselves modelled on 
the US Tax Disclosure Regulations. They have had modest success. 




The evidence cited above shows that the workers’ share of income and wealth has 
been eroded. Some may attribute this to labour markets, reserve army of labour, 
globalisation and deskilling, but such shifts are built around the logics of capital, 
often legitimised by accounting calculations and naturalised in everyday life. 
Following the worldview that private profits and welfare of capital is vital, 
organisations are urged to design “accounting systems to provide information on 
resource allocation, revenues, costs, assets and liabilities … performance 
measurement and evaluation of people ...” (Horngren et al., 2002, p. 5). Accounting 
text-books are replete with examples of techniques which can be used to extract 
surpluses from labour at reduced costs. These include standard costs, budgets, ad 
hoc reports and variance analysis. Lucey (2009) adds that the purpose of variance 
analysis is to enable management to “improve operations, increase efficiency, utilise 
resources more effectively and reduce costs” (p. 461). The traditional books may 
promote accounting as a technical activity, but these are also social practices for 
reproducing patterns of organisational, social, and political life (Sikka et al., 2007). 
They normalise the logic that reducing labour’s share of surpluses is a desirable 
solution to the welfare of capital.  
 
Accounting has played a key role in downsizing, factory/mine closures and 
disempowerment of labour (Radcliffe, Campbell and Fogarty, 2001).  Accounting 
numbers were central to one of the most decisive engagements between labour, 
capital and the UK state. In the early 1980s, the UK government and the National 
Coal Board (NCB) sought to close coal-mines on the basis of private costs (Berry et. 
al., 1988) which regarded wages as a drain on the enterprise. The NCB was advised 
by Price Waterhouse. Even though the entity was state-owned, it adopted the logics 
of private capital and the main argument was that the closure of selected mines 
would lead to cost savings and thus improve the bottom-line, a prelude to 
privatisation of a public owned enterprise. The accounting numbers emphasised 
private costs and ignored the negative impact of the job losses on the local 
community and even the state finances since those deprived of jobs would have 
qualified to receive social security payments. With alternative assumptions, it could 
have been shown that the mines designated for closure made a positive contribution 
and were not loss-making. This was a pivotal moment in the recent UK history and 
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trade unions did not appreciate the power of accounting in constructing logics of 
downsizing and closures. This particular battle was lost and “paved the way for the 
end of trade union power in Britain35”. 
 
However, arguing against the logic of welfare of capital, reductions in cost, efficiency 
and national wellbeing is difficult because these discourses are embedded in 
everyday life and arguments against them are portrayed as favouring the negatives. 
Thus, critics are accused of favouring inefficiencies, jeopardising the survival of 
enterprises and the wellbeing of the nation. The supporters of status-quo can wheel 
out accounting numbers, no matter how imperfect, to make their case and due to 
information asymmetries critics find it difficult to provide alternative numbers. 
 
The negative representations of wages paid to labour are all too evident in the 
current economic crisis. Academic researchers claim that rising labour costs are a 
threat to the wellbeing of the economy36. Michael Porter, an influential business 
strategy guru, identified five threats to a corporate profitability and one of these is 
apparently unionised labour’s ability to secure rewards (Porter, 2008). Despite a 
massive reduction in labour’s share of national income, companies claim that they 
are migrating because of high labour costs37. Unsurprisingly, daily newspapers claim 
“that economic revival is conditional upon employers being able to “reduce labour 
costs … employers will seek to contain wage costs in the coming years38”. Without 
ever mentioning the gains in corporate profitability, Ernst & Young (2011) claims that 
higher labour costs are driving the “production of certain goods away from the UK 
towards emerging markets”. The negative association of labour to the interests of 
                                                 
35 The Guardian, How miners' strike twice came close to being settled, 9 March 
2009 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/mar/09/miners-strike; accessed 18 
November 2011). 
36 The Daily Telegraph, Rise in running costs slows but labour costs high, 15 
December 2008 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/yourbusiness/3777639/Rise-in-
running-costs-slows-but-labour-costs-high.html; accessed 20 November 2011). 
37 The Daily Telegraph, High labour cost drives Samsung out of Britain, 16 January 
2004 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2874177/High-labour-cost-drives-
Samsung-out-of-Britain.html; accessed 20 November 2011). 
38 The Guardian, Unemployment to keep rising next year, says CIPD, 29 December 
2009 (http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/dec/29/unemployment-keep-rising-
in-2010; accessed 27 November 2011).  
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capital is amplified by the London Chamber of Commerce39 (2011) stating that 
“labour costs are now eating up all the benefit to businesses of cheaper borrowing 
costs … businesses will need to keep their labour costs under control … Overall 
cost inflation is low, but it will only stay that way if wage growth is held down … 
employers will need to keep wage costs down if firms are to rebuild their margins”.  
The idea that wages paid to labour can be destructive is amplified by the 
professional accountancy bodies. For example, the Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountants (ACCA) has long opposed the national minimum wage on the 
grounds that it damages profitability of small businesses (Mitchell and Sikka, 2006). 
Neither the professional bodies nor the mainstream accounting text-books stimulate 
any discussion of whether returns to capital should be controlled. They rarely note 
that lower wages may not enable workers to buy the goods and services produced 
by capitalist enterprises and thus fuel the economic crisis (Sikka et al., 2007). 
 
The discourses of cost minimisation, profit maximisation and efficiency have 
combined with broader capitalist concerns about maximising welfare of capital to 
undermine tax revenues accruing to the state. For example, a text-book specifically 
produced for the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) claims that 
the “primary objective of setting transfer prices is to maximise the profit of the 
company as a whole” (FTC Foulks Lynch, 2004, p. 447). Another text-book 
published by the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA) claims that 
there is a “natural inclination to set transfer prices in order to minimise tax 
payments” (Scarlett, 2004: 447). Minimisation of tax payments is promoted as 
universal and natural rather than the outcome of institutional structures and 
ideologies. There is no commentary on what promotes this ‘natural inclination’ and 
how it may be checked, especially as the capitalist drive to reduce taxes undermines 
the capacity of the state to redistribute wealth and reinvigorate economic activity. 
Thus generations of accountants are socialised into the view that designing 
accounting practices to avoid taxes is normal. 
 
                                                 
39  London chamber of Commerce, Press Release: Business suffer rising labour 
costs, 17 May 2010 
(http://www.londonchamber.co.uk/lcc_public/article.asp?id=0&did=47&aid=4317&st=
&oaid=-1; accessed 25 November 2011). 
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Despite a massive reduction in corporate tax rates, accountancy firms routinely 
claim that high corporate tax rates are driving businesses away from the UK even 
though they may be attracted by comparatively better roads, railways, education, 
healthcare, social infrastructure and public goods funded by tax revenues. Ernst & 
Young, together with banks and the Institute of Directors, advised the government 
that “cuts in corporation tax were desirable40” The firm campaigned for tax cuts for 
the wealthy by claiming that the “50p tax rate is damaging UK competitiveness41”. 
The firms encourage a race-to-the-bottom by arguing that unless countries reduce 
taxes for corporations and wealthy entrepreneurs they are somehow left behind and 
become uncompetitive. KPMG (2010) notes that the “headline corporate tax rates 
are being reduced in many countries, but it is critical to look deeper, and broader 
into the entire scope of taxation for companies … Tax is one of the important 
environmental variables, and has an impact on what kind of corporate structure is 
appropriate, where intellectual property should be located and how global supply 
chains should be configured to help control the overall effective tax rate  …It is 
becoming very clear that actively managing indirect tax performance can add to the 
bottom line of the business. Basic measures, such as reducing the impact of 
VAT/GST on cash flow and effectively reducing the amount of unrecovered 
VAT/GST can contribute to enhanced profitability” (p. 5, 7 and 9). The concern for 
the welfare of capital is not matched by any reflections on the implications of the 
cuts for citizens. 
 
Major accountancy firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, Deloitte & Touche and 
Ernst & Young) are a significant fraction of capital in their own right and are key 
players in the global tax avoidance industry as it enables them to earn private profits 
(Mitchell and Sikka, 2011). In 2004, the UK Chancellor called in senior partners from 
Deloitte and Touche, Ernst and Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers to 
warn them that the Government was concerned about the “rising scale, seriousness 
                                                 
40 The Daily Telegraph, Business calls for Brown to slash tax, 12 March 2007 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2805630/Business-calls-for-Brown-to-slash-
tax.html; accessed 25 November 2011). 
41  Ernst & Young press release, 50p tax rate is damaging UK competitiveness but 
mansion tax debate is a red herring, says Ernst & Young, 4 August 2011 
(http://www.ey.com/UK/en/Newsroom/News-releases/50p-tax-rate-is-damaging-UK-
competitiveness-but-mansion-tax-debate-is-a-red-herring-says-Ernst---Young; 
accessed 24 November 2011). 
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and aggression” of tax avoidance marketing. He told them it was wrong for firms to 
market loopholes when they knew the Revenue would close them down as soon as 
they could” 42. The Finance Act 2004 requirement for promoters to register their tax 
avoidance schemes with the tax authorities may have encouraged some reflections, 
but has not dampened the pursuit of private profits. Some countries, most notably 
the United States of America, have levied fines on firms and some of their partners 
have been sent to prison for facilitating tax evasion and fraud, but tax avoidance 
continues to be a growth area for major firms (Mitchell and Sikka, 2011). 
 
The Big Four accountancy firms are estimated to have over 80 offices in offshore tax 
havens that do not impose personal/corporate taxes or require companies to 
submit audited financial reports (Harari, Meinzer and Murphy, 2012). They also 
design tax havens to enable capital and wealthy elites to escape taxes. For 
example, in July 2008, PricewaterhouseCoopers partner Eric Crawford, also a past 
president of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Jamaica, submitted a report to 
the Jamaican government43 listing the steps it needs to take to become a tax haven. 
Accountancy firms are skilled at arbitraging tax laws and one partner declared44, “No 
matter what legislation is in place, the accountants and lawyers will find a way 
around it. Rules are rules, but rules are meant to be broken”. Christian-Aid added 
that  “Accountancy firms – many of them global corporations – are champions of ‘tax 
planning’ whereby, along with their clients, they organise networks of offshore 
subsidiaries to avoid paying tax” (Christian-Aid, 2005, p. 17) and  “giant accountancy 
firms such as KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young and Deloitte – who 
specialise in exploiting the existence of havens to minimise the tax liability of their 
clients, [are] impervious to the social consequences” (Christian-Aid, 2008, p.2).  
 
                                                 
42 The Times, Brown hits at 'aggressive' tax avoidance advice, 12 March 2004  
(http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/article2104496.ece; accessed on 25 July 
2011). 
43Jamaica Gleanor, Offshore centre won’t cave to market turmoil, 3 October 2008 
(http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20081003/business/business3.html; accessed 
29 October 2011). 
44 The Guardian, 'Be fair' plea as tax loopholes targeted, 18 March 2004 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2004/mar/18/budget2004.budget2004; 
accessed 15 November 2011). 
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In 2005, an internal study by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 
concluded that the UK-based Big Four accountancy firms were “behind almost half 
of all known avoidance schemes45”. Much of the trade is built around the notion of 
‘cost minimisation’ i.e. taxes are burdens which must be reduced and eliminated 
even though they enable the state to provide the necessary infrastructure and social 
order to enable capital to accumulate surpluses. The notion that tax is a cost, rather 
than a return on the investment of social capital, is routinely amplified by 
accountancy firms. For example, an Ernst & Young partner argued that “Tax is a 
cost of doing business so, naturally, a good manager will try to manage this cost and 
the risks associated with it” (Irish Times, 7 May 2004). Another Ernst & Young 
partner claimed that “Companies are constantly looking to save costs, and tax is a 
major cost46”. KPMG markets its consultancy services by stating that “By more 
effectively using transfer pricing, losses can be better utilised, the group’s effective 
tax rate may be lowered, or a decrease in quarterly corporation tax payments may 
be achieved, all resulting in immediate cash tax savings … a proven track record of 
using transfer pricing in the commercial environment to generate real cash tax 
savings for clients … we remain at the forefront of technical developments and 
thought leadership, having managed and delivered transfer pricing services on a 
global basis for some of the world’s largest and most complex multinational groups; 
we have delivered savings for one client of £80m over a three year period and £14m 
for another ... [We offer] Bespoke transfer pricing policy that minimises the group’s 
overall effective tax rate47”. Unsurprisingly, accountancy firms are key players in 
using transfer pricing to enable clients to reduce tax obligations (Sikka and Willmott, 
2010). 
 
                                                 
45 The Guardian, Gilt-edged profits for profession's 'big four', 7 February 2009 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/feb/07/tax-gap-avoidance-schemes; 
accessed 16 November 2011). 
46New York Times, Corporate Tax Loopholes Ripe for Crackdown, Some Say, 7 
April 2009 
(http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/08/business/global/08tax.html?pagewanted=1&_r
=1&sq=tax&st=nyt&scp=2; accessed 7November 2011. 
47 KPMG website 
(http://www.kpmg.com/uk/en/whatwedo/tax/corporatetax/pages/transferpricing.aspx; 
accessed 30 November 2011). 
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The logic of profit/wealth maximisation and cost minimisation has resulted in the 
creation of novel tax avoidance schemes (for further details see Mitchell and Sikka, 
2011) which boost the profits of corporations and income of the wealthy. For 
example, Ernst & Young designed a scheme enabling directors of Phones4u (part of 
the Dextra Group of Companies) to pay themselves in gold bars, fine wine, and 
platinum sponge48 and avoid income tax and National Insurance Contributions 
(NIC). As the legislative changes blocked this scheme, the firm devised another to 
enable directors of Phones4U (and other companies) to avoid NIC and income taxes 
by securing payments through an offshore employee benefit trust in Jersey49. In 
another scheme, Ernst & Young advised its audit client, a media company, to treat 
its newspaper mastheads as a new asset. These were transferred from subsidiaries 
to the parent company for a nominal sum and then leased back for annual royalties. 
Over a five year period, the subsidiaries paid royalties of £51.6 million. This 
intergroup transaction did not result in any transfer of cash to an external party, but 
the subsidiaries claimed tax relief on the royalty payments. The claim was rejected 
by a tax tribunal. The court papers showed that Ernst & Young (company auditor) 
had privately assured the client that the adoption of its tax avoidance schemes 
“would significantly lessen the transparency of reported results” (paragraph 54 of 
Iliffe News and Media Ltd & Ors v Revenue & Customs [2012] UKFTT 696 (TC) (01 
November 2012). The firm was also behind a novel scheme to enable major high 
street retailers to avoid VAT and increase their profits50. The scheme was ultimately 
thrown out by the courts and a Treasury spokesperson said that it was “one of the 
most blatantly abusive avoidance scams of recent years, and the court's decision to 
quash it is very welcome51".  
 
KPMG designed complex schemes to enable rich clients to avoid taxes through the 
use of IOUs and specially-created trusts. The resultant IOUs were then traded to 
banks at an apparent loss. The "loss" could then be offset against personal tax 
                                                 
48 Mail on Sunday, £6m tax threat to Phones4U founder, 15 February 2004. 
49For details, see HM Inspector of Taxes v Dextra Accessories Ltd [2005] UKHL 47 
50 Debenhams Retail Plc [2005] EWCA Civ 892, 18 July 2005 (available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2005/892.html). 
51 The Daily Telegraph, Debenhams lose VAT case, 19 July 2005 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2919204/Debenhams-loses-VAT-case.html; 
accessed 29 November 2011). 
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bills52. A KPMG scheme enabled companies and their employees to avoid National 
NIC and income tax53 by paying their directors with the debts of the company 
instead of cash54. Another KPMG scheme used specially created offshore entities in 
an attempt to boost a company’s profits through avoidance of VAT. The scheme 
was not developed in response to any request from the company; KPMG cold called 
the company. Its presentations were subject to a confidentiality undertaking being 
given. KPMG charged an initial fee and also received a share of the tax avoided. 
KPMG was aware that the tax authorities will consider the scheme to be 
“unacceptable tax avoidance and will seek to challenge the arrangements” 
(paragraph 22 of RAL (Channel Islands) Ltd v Customs and Excise [2002] UKVAT 
V17914) but still sold the scheme because it felt that the countermeasures will take 
some time to come into effect. The case subsequently went to the high court and the 
European court of justice and the scheme was quashed.  
 
In May 2012, a prime time documentary on BBC’s Panorama programme55 showed 
how PricewaterhouseCoopers devised schemes to enable multinational 
corporations, such as GlaxoSmithKline and Northern & Shell, to move profits to 
offshore tax havens via Luxembourg. The schemes involved a variety of intergroup 
loans, contrived interest payments and transfer pricing arrangements to reduce 
profits in the UK and avoid corporate taxes. Another PricewaterhouseCoopers 
designed scheme was sold to over 200 wealthy entrepreneurs to enable them to 
avoid tax on the gains made on sale of investments and businesses. Some £100 
million of tax revenues were at stake. A test case heard that an entrepreneur made 
a gain of £10,726,438 on the sale of his business, but was not keen to pay capital 
gains tax on it. For a fee of £200,000 PricewaterhouseCoopers devised a scheme 
which would generate £11 billion paper loss through a series of self-cancelling 
transactions thus wipe out the tax liability. The scheme was eventually thrown out by 
                                                 
52http://www.financeandtaxtribunals.gov.uk/judgmentfiles/j3422/SPC00628.doc 
53 Spectrum Computer Supplies Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners; 
Kirkstall Timber Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2006] STC (SCD) 
668. 
54 Accountancy Age, KPMG scheme advised paying directors with debt, 21 
September 2006 (http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/1785797/kpmg-
scheme-advised-paying-directors-debt; accessed 15 October 2011 
55 BBC News, Major UK companies cut secret tax deals in Luxembourg, 11 May 2012 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17993945; accessed 15 May 2012). 
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the Court of Appeal in the case of Schofield v HM Revenue and Customs 
[2012] EWCA Civ 927. The presiding judge said that for “capital gains purposes, 
there was no asset and no disposal. There was no real loss ...” (paragraph 42).  
 
Deloitte & Touche is under the spotlight for its links with the Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS), which was bailed out by the UK taxpayer, and is accused of avoiding £500 
million of taxes through complex avoidance schemes56. Another Deloitte scheme 
was manufactured to enable highly paid UK bankers to avoid income tax57. More 
than 300 bankers participated in the scheme which operated through a Cayman 
Islands-registered investment vehicle. A court held the scheme to be unlawful and 
said that “… the Scheme as a whole, and each aspect of it, was created and 
coordinated purely for tax avoidance purposes”.  
 
Interestingly, accountancy firms also invoke the notion of costs and competitive 
advantage to oppose clampdown on organised tax avoidance. In response to the 
UK government’s proposals requiring firms to accountants and other sellers of tax 
avoidance schemes to disclose their products to the tax authorities, a Grant 
Thornton partner said that "It will add to the cost to business as companies will have 
to take advice on what is allowed. Then they will have to wait for schemes to be 
approved. It's extra red tape for all concerned58”. In response to another government 
proposal to judge tax avoidance schemes on the basis of their economic substance 
rather than the form, a KPMG partner said that “It will make the UK less competitive. 
Inward investors will have a sword of Damocles over their head. Either they will do 
no planning at all or they will do it not knowing when this will be invoked59” 
 
5. Summary and discussion  
                                                 
56 The Guardian, RBS avoided £500m of tax in global deals, 13 March 2009 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/mar/13/rbs-tax-avoidance; accessed 29 
October 2011). 
57 Deutsche Bank Group Services (UK) Ltd v Revenue & Customs [2011] UKFTT 66 
(TC) (19 January 2011) 
58 The Daily Telegraph, Crackdown on avoidance 'will hit firms', 18 March 2004 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2880308/Crackdown-on-avoidance-will-hit-
firms.html; accessed 17 October 2011). 





There is an emerging consensus that inequalities in the distribution of income and 
wealth are a key cause of the deepening economic crisis (Iacoviello, 2008; Rajan, 
2010; Kumhof and Rancière, 2010; Stiglitz, 2012). The erosion of the share of 
national wealth going to labour has reduced the purchasing power of ordinary 
people. In principle, the neoliberal state can redistribute wealth to boost the 
purchasing power of middle classes and the low-paid groups, but tax revenues are 
under attack not only from the race-to-the-bottom logic of neoliberal globalization but 
also from accounting firms, key players in a highly organised tax avoidance industry.  
 
The negative signs assigned to the payment of wages and taxes have increased 
inequalities and eroded the ordinary person’s capacity to spend and maintain a 
sustained economic recovery. The UK workers’ share of the national income, 
expressed as a percentage of GDP, has declined from 65.1% to 53.8%. The 
reduction in the workers’ share is enmeshed in the institutional structures specific to 
the UK. The 1980s state sponsored restructuring of the economy and trade union 
reforms have severely eroded the market and political power of workers’ and their 
ability to maintain share of national income. At the same time unlike many other 
western countries (e.g. Scandinavian countries), there has been no attempt to enrol 
workers and/or trade unions to any corporate governance mechanisms where 
issues about share of economic surpluses could be discussed. Since the 1990s, a 
number of corporate governance codes have been issued (for example see 
Committee on the Financial aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992; Committee on 
Corporate Governance, 1998; Financial Reporting Council, 2010) to deal with 
executive remuneration, but the codes are silent on the rights of workers to 
equitable wages or the payment of democratically agreed taxes, 
 
The UK state has significantly tilted to the right and prioritised the interests of 
capital. Thus the rate of corporate profitability, before tax and interest payments at 
current replacement cost, rose from 3.9% in 1975 to over 12% in 2011. The 
increase has primarily been at the expense of workers. The UK state also reduced 
the tax rates for corporation and rich individuals, shrinking the tax revenues accruing 
to the state from 38.2% of GDP in 1982-83 to 35.5% in 2012-13. This decline has 
also been aided by accounting firms selling tax avoidance schemes. The result has 
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been a shifting of tax burdens with the consequence that households in the bottom 
20% of income distribution pay 35.5% of their gross income in direct and indirect 
taxes compared to 33.7% for the top 20% of households.  
 
This paper has argued that everyday accounting practices and the fee earning 
opportunities of major accounting firms are central to an understanding of the 
inequitable distribution of income and wealth, a major cause of the economic crisis. 
Daily accounting practices are political in that they influence the lived experiences of 
the citizens through transfers of wealth and enactment of controls. Accounting 
practices prioritise the welfare of capital and aid capitalist calculations in two ways. 
Firstly, to advance discourses of efficiency, competition and profits for the benefit of 
capital, they give visibility to things that are to be controlled, manipulated and 
reduced. Thus accounting technologies refer to payment of wages and taxes as 
costs or burdens that obstruct the expansion of capital and managers are invited to 
take action to reduce the burdens. Accounting practices affirm the commonsensical 
understanding that higher return to capital is good, higher profit is preferable to a 
lower profit and that lower rewards for labour and tax payments are desirable. 
Secondly, accounting creates invisibilities as the welfare of employees and citizens 
is reduced to anonymous numbers who can be ignored and made irrelevant. 
Accounting practices celebrate the gains to capital, but do not give visibility to the 
human consequences of the drive to reduce wages and tax payments.  
 
Accounting firms enhance their social legitimacy through promises of ethical conduct 
and claims of serving the public interest. However, such matters rarely form part of 
their business models.  As Hanlon (1994) puts it, within major firms “the emphasis is 
very firmly on being commercial...rather than on being public spirited on behalf of 
either the public or the state” (p. 150). The firms are promoters and beneficiaries of 
the discourse of cost minimization to enable their clients to avoid taxes. Some of the 
internal documentation relating to design and marketing of tax avoidance schemes 
by accounting firms has become publicly available through parliamentary hearings 
(for example, US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2003, 2005) 
and court cases (see Mitchell and Sikka, 2011), and shows that the firms pay no 
attention to the social consequences of their trade. 
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It may be argued that accounting is a benign and neutral technology (Solomons, 
1991) and thus cannot facilitate inequalities and economic crisis. One response is 
that like other social technologies accounting practices and their enmeshing with 
contemporary ideologies and worldviews is constituted by particular histories, 
institutions and interests. It represents the interests of the dominant class and in 
return accountants are rewarded with status and niches (Johnson, 1972). However, 
the effects of accounting are filtered through institutional structures. The negative 
signs assigned to wages and taxes can be resisted by countervailing power 
structures, but the market and political power of UK trade unions is comparatively 
weak. For example, the state has tilted to the right and only 26.6% of UK workers 
are in trade unions compared to 69.2% in Finland, 68.4% in Sweden, 66.6% in 
Denmark and 54.4% in Norway60. Unlike the UK, Scandinavian states have co-opted 
trade unions into corporate governance mechanisms. Thus there are opportunities 
for influencing the division of income. Perhaps, that is why the logics of accounting 
are less influential and income and wealth inequalities are lower in Scandinavian 
countries (Roine and Waldenström, 2009). 
 
Income and wealth inequalities matter not only on the grounds of social justice, but 
also on pragmatic economic grounds. In his influential work Keynes (1936) argued 
that the marginal propensity to consume is weaker in wealthy sections of the society 
whereas it is much higher in the middle and lower income and wealth brackets. The 
less wealthy people are likely to spend a greater part of their income on 
consumption and thus stimulate the economy. Their spending has a greater 
multiplier effect on the economy. On the other hand, the more wealthy people spend 
a comparatively small part of their income to meet their needs and are more likely to 
engage in esoteric expenditure which may create a few jobs for advisers and 
intermediaries, but generally have a low multiplier effect. The patterns of distribution 
and income and wealth, therefore, have crucial impact on economic activity. The 
changes in the UK income and wealth distribution have sapped ordinary people’s 
                                                 
60 The Spectator, To reduce inequality, we need stronger trade unions, 22 
September 2011 (http://www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2011/09/trade-unions-
british; accessed 29 November 2011). 
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ability to stimulate the economy and many have turned to personal debt. The 
banking crisis has made it harder for the less well-off to borrow and in any case it is 
difficult to see why they should continue to borrow to stimulate the economy.  
 
The inevitable question is what can be done to secure an equitable distribution of 
income. Such inquiries raise profound questions about the nature of capitalist 
economies, neoliberal democracy and power structures. The creation of a more 
equal society would involve politics and public campaigns to change the nature of 
corporations, democracy and policymaking apparatuses. However, there is always 
accounting lurking in the background, constantly adjudicating on social conflicts and 
taking sides by attaching negative signs to the payment of wages and taxes and 
measuring income by privileging the interests of shareholders. In public spaces, 
accounting numbers have the aura of exactness and their partisanship is rarely 
questioned. Then there are accountancy firms who promote the interests of capital 
and wealthy elites through tax avoidance schemes and undermine the possibilities 
of redistributing wealth and reducing inequalities. Therefore, emancipatory is 
unlikely without sustained public engagement with accounting and accountancy 
firms. Cooper (1995) draws attention to the difficulties of mobilising accounting for 
emancipatory change by noting that “Accounting rhetoric is ideologically 
authoritative in advanced capitalism. Arguments using terms outside of dominant 
discourses fail to win credibility and are often viewed through the spectacles of  
common sense as being illogical, irrational, or are not even heard or considered … 
on a practical level, those who fight for their position using accounting rhetoric may 
quickly find themselves trapped in circular debates about which are correct figures 
…” (p. 202). These are powerful arguments and provide opportunities to reconstruct 
accounting by highlighting the negative social consequences of conventional 
practices. Though, theoretically, it is possible to develop alternative accounting 
models which emphasize welfare of employees and society (Thomas and Williams, 
2009), accounting academics have been somewhat reluctant to popularise 
competing discourses through public critiques of conventional wisdom (Shaoul, 
1997). This reluctance could be assuaged by reflections on historical episodes 
which show that democratic politics can be refreshed through alternative analysis, 
media reports, oratory, populist leaflets, comedy, satire, art, theatre, music and other 
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public interventions (Thompson, 1963) and thus create possibilities for millions of 
people to live fulfilling lives.  
 
In due course, it may be possible to develop social cost accounting and highlight the 
social impact of corporate practices, though that has proven difficult (Bebbington 
and Gray, 2001). Even if social cost accounting could be refined there is no 
guarantee that on its own it will necessarily have the ideological effects sought 
because the new signs will need to displace the dominant discourses which see 
wages and tax payments as costs and are already embedded within the capitalist 
system, media, education and daily practices. Thus, a public engagement with the 
conventional logics of accounting is unavoidable and requires development of 
political strategies to highlight the partisan nature of conventional accounting.  
 
Another possibility is to build on accounting’s capacity to give visibility to labour 
costs and draw attention to the shrinking share of workers. Currently, the UK 
companies publish the total amount of wages and salaries paid to workers. These 
are not expressed as a ratio, or a percentage of value-added. Therefore, the 
workers’ shrinking share is not easily evident. Even if companies do not publish the 
ratio of value-added gained by workers, such a calculation could be made and 
publicised by critical academics. The disclosures can stimulate debates and draw 
attention to exploitation of workers, which also undermines the ability of business 
enterprises to make profits. The disclosures may also encourage some consumers 
to boycott companies engaged in excessive exploitation of workers and mobilise 
demands for enhanced worker rights. The invisibilities created by the logics of 
accounting could be problematised by stories of how life on low income blights 
social mobility, access to education, healthcare and homes (Abrams, 2002; 
Toynbee, 2003); yet accounting calculations fail to acknowledge any of the social 
problems. Such politics hold out the possibilities of transcending the narrow 
instrumental worldviews embedded in capitalist calculations and promote an 
equitable distribution of income. 
 
On tax matters, accountancy firms should be reminded that they enjoy state 
guaranteed markets (e.g. external audits) and that in return society expects a certain 
code of ethical behaviour. This part of the social contract should be enforced by 
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public investigations, fines and penalties (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, 2003, 2005) and withdrawal of all state guaranteed contracts and 
privileges for firms engaging in aggressive tax avoidance. Accountancy firms should 
be required to disclose the income derived from the sale of avoidance schemes. 
Corporate financial statements also need to be reformed. Currently, they provide 
little information about tax avoidance. Consolidated financial statements generally 
publish just one amount for the tax charge in the profit and loss account, or tax 
payment in the cash flow statement for the whole entity, even though it may trade in 
dozens of countries. Sikka (2011) draws attention to the case of Google Ireland 
Limited which with around 1,500 staff generated a turnover of €10.9bn. The 
company reported pre-tax profits of only €18.5m and paid €5.6m in corporation tax. 
A key to reduction of taxable profits is the royalties paid to offshore subsidiaries, 
which count as deductible expense in one place, but tax-free income elsewhere. 
This begs questions about the amount of taxes, if any, paid in countries where the 
economic transactions take place. One response to this is to require companies to 
embrace country-by-country reporting (Murphy, 2003). This would require 
corporations to publish a table showing their sales, profits, costs, employees and tax 
paid in each geographical jurisdiction of their operations. This would immediately 
give some visibility to anomalies of companies having a large volume of sales in one 
country, but with revenues and profits booked at another place with relatively few 
employees. This information could be accompanied by public availability of the tax 
returns of corporations and wealthy elites so that citizens can see how they have 
managed to avoid their tax obligations and thus perpetuate inequalities. This 
information would also enable people to develop counter accounts and challenge 
the narratives offered by corporations and their advisers. 
 
The reforms need to be accompanied by processes that enable people’s voices to 
be heard, especially in arenas which make decisions about tax avoidance and 
erosion of workers’ wages. Corporations are key sites for such decisions and have 
generally disenfranchised workers. This could be addressed by political demands 
that permit workers to elect directors, have representatives on remuneration 
committees and vote on executive remuneration. However, given the right-wing tilt 
of the UK politics these possibilities are unlikely to be realised in the short/medium 
term. On the other hand, the concern with the long-term welfare of capital requires 
 39
that the state develop (re)distributive policies to prevent chronic underconsumption. 
The state’s own legitimacy depends on consent from the masses and it needs to be 
seen to be processing demands for an equitable distribution of income and wealth. 
This suggests that trade unions need to develop political strategies to change the 
ideological climate not only by appealing to their members, but also to other social 
constituencies by building alliances with pensioners, the unemployed, part-time 
workers and the underprivileged so that they are seen as representing a larger 
section of the community rather than just those with regular incomes.  
 
This paper has primarily focused on the UK, considered to be an exemplar of 
neoliberalism. However, neoliberalism is actively promoted by contemporary 
economic theories and the UK is not alone in pursuing policies which have eroded 
ordinary person’s purchasing power. Thus, the general analysis of the paper is likely 
to have some application to other neoliberal societies. For example, income and 
wealth inequalities have also widened in the US and are considered to be a key 
cause of the economic crisis (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010; Stiglitz, 2012). It is quite 
likely that accounting practices and accountancy firms have also played a major role 
in creating and sustaining the inequalities in other places too. The extent to which 
the power of accountants and the logic of accounting is naturalised, or is resisted 
depends on local politics, countervailing institutional structures, trade unions, modes 
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